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www.floridajuice.com Impacts of the European Union Tariff  
On the Florida Price for Grapefruit Juice 
  The European Union (EU) imposes a 12% ad valorem tariff on imports of grapefruit juice 
(GJ) from the United States and, in general, other countries.  Israel, one major GJ supplier to 
Europe, is exempt from the duty.  The U.S. is Europe’s largest supplier of GJ, followed by Israel, 
Cuba and South Africa.  The U.S. share of EU imports of GJ was 26.3% in 2009, but had been as 
high as 34.6% in 2003 before Florida, which accounts for most of the U.S. exports of GJ, was 
struck by several hurricanes and its production was significantly reduced (Table 1).  Florida 
exports of GJ are a major part of Florida’s GJ total sales, accounting for 41.5% and 36.9% of its 
total movement in 2008-09 and 2009-10, respectively.
1  The EU and Japan are Florida’s largest 
export markets.
2  Volume sales in these markets are relatively sensitive to price (Brown and 
Guci).
3  Thus, the EU import duty, which increases the GJ price in that market, significantly 
deters GJ sales there.  The purpose of this study is to estimate the impact of the EU GJ tariff on 
the Florida grower price and the value of removing this tariff for Florida grapefruit growers. 
Analysis 
An ideal model for this study might be an econometric model of world GJ supply and 
demand that includes a relationship between the grower price and the EU tariff and fits the data 
well.  Estimating such a model, however, is problematic, given the EU tariff has been in place 
for some time with relatively limited variation, and data on the various factors impacting world 
supply and demand for GJ are lacking.  As a result, the approach taken in this study is to 
construct a model based on previous estimates made and simplifying assumptions.  The 
assumptions result in a model that reflects basic market forces underlying the GJ price. 
The analysis is based on a world model for GJ under competition, similar to the world OJ 
model developed by Spreen, Brewster and Brown; and Brown.
4  The first equation in this model 
is the EU demand for GJ which can be written as 
(1) q1 = α1 +β1 (p +c)(1+t), 
where q1 is the quantity demanded by processors in the EU, p is the Florida FOB price, c is the 
Florida cost of transporting GJ to Europe; and t is the EU tariff (.12).
5  The price (p + c) is the 
                                                            
1  See Florida Citrus Outlook, 2010-11, Table 16, page 34, Florida Department of Citrus, at 
http://www.fdocgrower.com/d/economic_and_market_research/publications_and_presentations/outlook-
florida_citrus/2010-2011.pdf. 
2 See Florida Citrus Outlook, 2010-11, Table 17, page 35, at web site above. 
3 See Market and Economic Research Department, Florida Department of Citrus staff report 2004-2, “U.S. 
Grapefruit Juice Export Demand, Price and Exchange Rate Effects,” by Mark Brown; and staff report 2008-2, 
“Exchange Rates and the Export Demand for U.S. Grapefruit Juice, by Ledia Guci. 
4 “The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Market for Processed Orange Products,” by T. Spreen, C. Brewster 
and M. Brown, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 35, 1 (April 2003): 107-126; and “Impacts on U.S. 
Prices of Reducing Orange Juice Tariffs in Major World Market”, Journal of Food Distribution, 35,2 (July, 
2004):26-33. 2 
 
landed price in Europe and is equivalent to the cost-insurance-freight price (CIF).  The price (p + 
c) (1+t) is the tariff-paid price in Europe.  It is assumed that all suppliers face the same tariff-paid 
price and CIF price for the same quality product, but the cost of transporting GJ to Europe differs 
across suppliers, resulting in varying country specific FOB prices.  That is, with p + c being the 
CIF price for Florida product and pi + ci being the CIF price for some other country i, where pi 
and ci are that other country’s FOB price and transportation cost, respectively, the condition p +c 
= pi +ci is required, implying pi = p +c - ci.  The costs c and ci are treated as constants and thus 
changes in the Florida and other country FOB prices are assumed to be the same.  The terms α1 
and β1 are parameters to be estimated. 
  The total domestic supply of GJ in the EU, including product from Israel, is denoted by 
Q1. At all prices p under consideration, it is assumed that EU demand exceeds EU supply or 
there is excess demand (ED) of the amount 
(2) ED = α1 +β1 (p +c) (1+t) - Q1. 
On the other hand, the U.S. and the rest of the world (ROW) are assumed to have excess 
supply (ES), i.e., 
(3) ES = Q2 – (α2 +β2 p), 
where Q2 and (α2 +β2 p) are U.S.-ROW supply and demand for GJ, respectively, and, as in the 
case of ED, the Florida price p is used as a world price (again, differences in prices across the 
world are constant and changes in these prices follow changes in the Florida price p).  The terms 
α2 and β2 are additional parameters to be estimated. 
  In equilibrium, ED =ES or 
(4) α1 +β1 (p +c)(1+t) - Q1 = Q2 – (α2 + β2 p), 
or, rearranging, 
(5) p = (Q1 + Q2 – (α1 + α2) - β1 c (1+t)) / (β1 (1+t) + β2). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 There are two product forms, not from concentrate GJ (NFC) and frozen concentrated GJ (FCGJ).  It is assumed 
that the grower price for each product is the same and the FOB, NFC price is equal to the FOB, FCGJ price plus a 
fixed margin representing additional costs.  EU demand for product k from country i can be written as qik = αik +βik1 
(pi +ci1) (1+t) + βik2 (pi +ci2) (1+t), where k=1 for FCGJ and k=2 for NFC (the two price terms are for the own- and 
cross-price effects; although not considered here the c’s may also change, perhaps due to promotions resulting in 
cross-price effects between product forms). The cost ci2 for NFC includes additional processor costs above those for 
FCGJ plus product specific transportation costs.  Summing across k results in qi = αi +βi (pi +ci) (1+t), where qi = qi1 
+ qi2, αi = αi1 + αi2, βi = βi11 + βi12 + βi21 + βi22, and ci = wi2ci1 + wi2ci2, where wi1 = (βi11 + βi21) / βi and wi2 = (βi12 + 
βi22) / βi.  Again, assuming the CIF price pi + ci is the same across countries results in qi = αi +βi (p +c) (1+t) and 
summing over i results in equation (1) where q1 = ∑qi, α1 = ∑αi , and β1= ∑βi. 
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Equation (5) shows the equilibrium Florida FOB price for a given world supply (Q1 + Q2), 
world demand parameters (α1, α2, β1, and β2), the cost parameter c and the tariff parameter t.  To 
determine the impact of the tariff on the Florida FOB price, equation (5) can be evaluated with 
the tariff parameter t at .12 and without the tariff (zero).  The benefits to Florida growers can 
then be estimated as the difference in the with- and without-tariff prices times Florida GJ 
production. 
When the tariff is removed, all else constant, the EU price declines by (p + c)t, creating 
excess demand of the amount β1 (p + c)t.  The excess demand then sets in motion changes across 
world markets, forcing price p to increase until it reaches a new equilibrium level as indicated by 
equation (5) with t = 0. 
Results 
  Equation (5) was evaluated with and without the EU tariff based on the price elasticities 
and market volumes in Table 2.  Given the lack of demand parameters by product form and that 
FCGJ accounts for roughly 70% to 80% of Florida’s total GJ exports, the FOB, FCGJ price and 
transportation cost for FCGJ were used in evaluating equation (5).  The FOB price for FCGJ was 
constructed as the three year average (2006-07 through 2008-09) Florida delivered-in grower 
price,
6 plus an estimated $.35 per pound solids (PS) processing cost.  The transportation cost 
from Florida to Europe was set at $.14/PS, based on the difference between the estimated FOB, 
FCGJ price and the corresponding average CIF in Table 1.  Results are shown in Table 3.  The 
estimates suggest that removal of the EU tariff could result in an increase in the FOB price of 
$.05 to $.07 per single-strength-equivalent (SSE) gallon, depending on the price elasticities used.  
Given constant processing costs, the Florida grower price would increase by the same amount as 
the FOB price increase.  Florida production of GJ was 57.1 million SSE gallons in 2009-10.  
Assuming the grower price increases by the average of the two estimates ($.063 per SSE), the 
value of GJ produced would increase by $3.6 million ($.063 per SSE gallon times 57.1 million 
SSE gallons). 
Although not the focus of this study, the tariff paid price in Europe would decline by an 
estimated $.06 per SSE gallon which would expand sales there by an estimated 3.1 million SSE 
gallons, benefitting EU consumers. 
An alternative approach supports the foregoing analysis.  Previous unpublished analysis 
of the Florida GJ situation by the Florida Department of Citrus suggests that as the Florida GJ 
inventory in weeks (inventory divided by average weekly movement) declines by one week, the 
Florida grower price tends to increase by $.02 to $.03 per SSE gallon.  Being the largest GJ 
producer in the world, Florida may be able to capture much of the estimated increase in EU GJ 
demand noted above.  Assuming Florida alternatively captures 1/3, 1/2 and 2/3 of the estimated 
marginal imports of 3.1 million SSE gallons, the Florida grower price would increase by $.04, 
                                                            
6 Florida Citrus Outlook; see footnote 1. 4 
 
$.05 and $.07 per SSE gallon, respectively, assuming a one-week decline in ending inventory 
increases the price by $.025 per SSE gallon. 
Conclusions 
  GJ exports account for a major part of Florida as well as U.S. GJ sales, accounting for 
41.5% and 36.9% of total Florida GJ sales in 2008-09 and 2009-10.  The largest export market in 
many of the recent years has been the EU.  The EU imposes a 12% ad valorem tariff on GJ 
imports, resulting in a higher price for GJ there and a lower volume demanded than would be 
expected otherwise.  Based on the analysis of this study, it is estimated that removal of the EU 
tariff would result in increased sales of GJ in the EU, benefitting consumers in Europe, and a 
higher price for Florida growers.  The Florida grower price and annual revenue were estimated to 
increase by $.06 per SSE gallon and $3.6 million, respectively, if the EU tariff were removed. 
 Table 1. E.U. (15) GJ Imports.                           
   NFC/Other GJ 
From World  From U.S. 
Season  mil $  mt  mil ps
a  $/ps  mil $  mt  mil ps
a  $/ps  $ share  mt share 
2002  35.097  65,427  14.4  2.43  12.898  25,991  5.7  2.25  36.7%  39.7% 
2003  37.278  68,507  15.1  2.47  16.383  30,565  6.7  2.43  43.9%  44.6% 
2004  35.217  66,613  14.7  2.40  14.160  28,655  6.3  2.24  40.2%  43.0% 
2005  45.095  69,924  15.4  2.93  10.210  15,868  3.5  2.92  22.6%  22.7% 
2006  49.232  67,224  14.8  3.32  12.771  14,914  3.3  3.88  25.9%  22.2% 
2007  49.696  73,491  16.2  3.07  13.552  21,548  4.8  2.85  27.3%  29.3% 
2008  52.556  83,166  18.3  2.87  11.652  21,314  4.7  2.48  22.2%  25.6% 






Season  mil $  mt  mil ps
b  $/ps  mil $  mt  mil ps
b  $/ps  $ share  mt share 
2002  64.136  50,278  64.3  1.00  20.064  15,734  20.1  1.00  31.3%  31.3% 
2003  53.913  43,876  56.1  0.96  17.862  13,994  17.9  1.00  33.1%  31.9% 
2004  60.999  56,308  72.0  0.85  18.181  15,575  19.9  0.91  29.8%  27.7% 
2005  56.749  36,383  46.5  1.22  10.896  5,459  7.0  1.56  19.2%  15.0% 
2006  76.281  37,817  48.4  1.58  14.345  5,960  7.6  1.88  18.8%  15.8% 
2007  65.358  37,383  47.8  1.37  18.888  9,840  12.6  1.50  28.9%  26.3% 
2008  50.215  38,258  48.9  1.03  14.672  10,809  13.8  1.06  29.2%  28.3% 




Table 1. E.U. (15) GJ Imports, continued.                        
   Total GJ 
From World  From U.S. 
Season  mil $  mil ps  $/ps  mil $  mil ps  $/ps  $ share  ps share 
2002  99.2  78.7  1.26  33.0  25.8  1.28  32.8%  32.8% 
2003  91.2  71.2  1.28  34.2  24.6  1.39  34.6%  34.6% 
2004  96.2  86.7  1.11  32.3  26.2  1.23  30.3%  30.3% 
2005  101.8  61.9  1.64  21.1  10.5  2.01  16.9%  16.9% 
2006  125.5  63.2  1.99  27.1  10.9  2.49  17.3%  17.3% 
2007  115.1  64.0  1.80  32.4  17.3  1.87  27.1%  27.1% 
2008  102.8  67.3  1.53  26.3  18.5  1.42  27.5%  27.5% 












b  59.1 ‐ 0.43 ‐ 0.43 
EU
c  54.3 ‐ 0.96 ‐ 1.13 
Japan
c  18.2 ‐ 1.59 ‐ 0.64 
Canada
d  6.4 ‐ 0.48 ‐ 0.37 
Other




















a                           
   Demand Equation  FOB Price Elast.  q1  p β 1
b  α1  c  t 
EU α 1 +β1 (p +c)(1+t) ‐ 0.96  54.3  0.93 ‐ 49.8  113.0  0.12  0.12 
FOB Price Elast.  q2  p β 2
c  α2 
U.S.  & ROW  α2 + β2 p  ‐0.70  89.9  0.93 ‐ 67.6  153.1        
   Price Equation  Q1 + Q2 α 1+α2 β 1 c (1+t) β 1(1+t)+ β2  p
d  p
e    
p with tariff (t=.12)  p = (Q1 + Q2 – (α1 + α2) - 
β1 c (1+t)) / (β1 (1+t) + 
β2) 
144.2  266.1 ‐ 6.53 ‐ 123.4  0.93  0.93    













2009‐10  0.33  0.50  0.67 
million SSE gallons 
Beginning Inventory  45.7  45.7  45.7  45.7 
Production  58.0  58.0  58.0  58.0 
Availability  103.7  103.7  103.7  103.7 
Movement  61.6  62.6  63.1  63.6 
Ending Inventory  42.1  41.0  40.5  40.0 
weeks 
Carry Over  35.5  34.1  33.4  32.7 
$/SSE gallon 
Price Impact
b     0.04  0.05  0.07 
a Share of EU marginal imports of 3.1 million SSE gallons captured by Florida. 
b Change in weeks from 2009‐10 season times $.025/SSE gallon. 
 